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Introduction
Standard tax competition models predict a 'race-to-the-bottom' of corporate tax rates when firms are mobile. The new economic geography (NEG) literature has qualified this view by offering a theoretical explanation why this extreme prediction need not occur:
central regions with large clusters of economic activity are able to set positive tax rates without fearing to lose firms to peripheral regions as the firms would forego 'rents' from agglomeration economies such as market access, supplier proximity or knowledge spillovers.
In this paper, we study whether local policy makers effectively tax agglomeration rents, and whether this effect is strong enough to have a noticeable impact on the evolution of statutory corporate tax rates across Swiss urban areas and municipalities.
The NEG prediction can be tested by showing that small regions exhibit lower tax rates than bigger ones. Although this test seems straightforward to implement there is a series of challenges. First, the standard tax competition model with asymmetric jurisdiction size also predicts that small locations (tax havens) have lower tax rates than large ones, but the economic implications are very different. To separate the two predictions we make a clear difference between the political and the economic size of a location. To identify the two effects separately, we take advantage of the fact that small and medium sized municipalities can be found both in the centre and the periphery of an urban area.
Second, unobserved and unobservable local characteristics could have an important effect on local tax rates. We therefore control for observable location characteristics in our crosssection analysis. Furthermore, we control for unobserved local characteristics by including municipality fixed effects in our panel analysis. Third, the size of local jurisdictions is likely affected by local tax rates and therefore endogenous. We instrument for location size with a set of variables based on 19th century population, initially available land reserves and initial sector composition.
A further empirical challenge arises from the elegant but unrealistic description of local jurisdictions in the theoretical models. The theoretical literature assumes that local jurisdictions are politically and economically independent from each other. In reality, countries are typically divided into economically fairly independent urban areas which are formed of a multitude of economically dependent and politically fairly independent municipalities. We develop two strategies to address this issue. First, we do an analysis at the urban area level, treating each urban area as an independent entity. In this approach, economic and political size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the urban area, overlap.
Second, we do a municipality level analysis. In this approach, the political and economic size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the municipality, diverge. We therefore introduce two different measures for the economic size of the municipality: economic activity within the legal borders and the distance weighted size of economic activity within and around the municipality.
Another aspect typically ignored by the theoretical literature is the industry composition of agglomeration. Because different industries can exhibit different degrees of agglomeration economies, the industry composition at the local level could have an important effect on taxation. We therefore propose a new cluster intensity measure to deal with this problem.
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. The Swiss federation consists of three government layers (federal, cantonal and municipal), with each jurisdictional level collecting a roughly similar share of total tax revenue. Cantons and municipalities enjoy vast autonomy in the determination of their tax rates, and, as a consequence, we observe large variations in tax burdens even within the small area covered by Switzerland. The Swiss fiscal system therefore provides a well suited laboratory in which to examine our research question.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy. In section 4, we describe data and variables used for the estimations. The results of the main analysis are reported in section 5. In section 6, we propose a new cluster measure and discuss the results using this alternative measure. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical Background and Empirical Literature
The implications of agglomeration economies for strategic tax setting have been studied in a number of theoretical contributions, including Ludema of this literature is that agglomeration forces make the world 'lumpy': when capital (or any other relevant production factor) is mobile and trade costs are sufficiently low, agglomeration forces lead to spatial concentrations of firms which cannot easily be dislodged by tax differentials. Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) have shown that in the presence of agglomeration economies tax competition can be second-best welfare-enhancing, as it may mitigate a tendency towards excessive spatial concentration of firms. In fact, agglomeration externalities create rents that can in principle be taxed by the jurisdiction hosting the agglomeration.
This prediction contrasts with results from the standard tax competition literature, where mobile factors such as capital lead to inefficiently low tax rates because of com-petition among local governments. The standard tax competition literature goes back to Oates (1972) , who already describes how jurisdictions lower tax rates to attract business investment. The first formalised models were developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) . These papers find that because of tax competition local governments set capital tax rates and the level of public spending inefficiently low.
In an extension to the standard tax competition literature, Bucovetsky (1986) and Wilson (1991) introduce asymmetric country size. They find that because the marginal product of capital is higher in the smaller country, the elasticity of capital with respect to the capital tax rate must be higher. This results in lower tax rates in the smaller country, which therefore will be a tax haven. Hence, both the New Economic Geography model and the tax haven model can predict a positive correlation between jurisdiction size and tax rates; though the economic mechanisms and implications are very different.
Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007) have studied whether the main mechanism behind the NEG prediction is at work, i.e. whether firms really are less sensitive to local taxes in the presence of agglomeration economies. Drawing on a firm-level dataset for Switzerland and employing fixed-effects count-data estimation techniques, we found that firm births on average react negatively to corporate tax burdens, but that the deterrent effect of taxes is weaker in sectors that are more spatially concentrated. Firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are up to 50 percent more responsive to a given difference in corporate tax burdens than firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile.
There is yet only preliminary direct evidence of the NEG prediction. Charlot and and market potential on the Spanish municipal business tax rate. Using a cross-section of Spanish municipality level data, they find that all of the above factors have a positive effect on tax rates. Koh and Riedel (2010) determine the tax effect of urbanisation and localisation economies, and investigate whether differentiation from neighbouring economies has an effect on business tax rates. Using panel data for local business tax rates in Germany, they find a positive impact of agglomeration and differentiation on tax rates.
Our paper is complementary to these three studies and seeks to overcome their short-comings in several dimensions. First, we analyse data for Switzerland which is the only country studied so far where local business taxes are substantial enough to plausibly matter for business location. Second, we study the evolution of local tax rates over a much longer time horizon (20 years) than previous research. Our paper has therefore the potential to cover substantial changes in the size of local jurisdictions. Third, we propose new and in our opinion more convincing instruments for the employment growth rate of locations. Fourth, we explicitly address and operationalise the important distinction between the political and economic size of local jurisdictions, which has been ignored in previous studies.
The econometric model
The theoretical literature elegantly assumes that local jurisdictions are politically and economically independent from each other. In reality, countries are typically divided into economically fairly independent urban areas which are formed of a multitude of politically fairly independent municipalities. We develop two strategies to address this issue. First, we do an analysis at the urban area level, treating each urban area as an independent entity. In this first approach, economic and political size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the urban area, overlap. Second, we do a municipality level analysis. In this second approach, the political and economic size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the municipality, diverge.
We therefore introduce two different measures for the economic size of the municipality: economic activity within the legal borders and the distance weighted size of economic activity within and around the municipality. See the description of the corresponding variables in section 4.3 for the operationalisation of these two variables.
We estimate the following relationship at the urban area level :
Where T ax a is the average tax rate over the individual municipalities of the urban area a, location size Empl a is measured as total employment in the urban area and X a is a vector of other characteristics describing the urban area.
We estimate the following relationship at the municipality level :
where Empl
is the location size within the legal borders of municipality i, Empl 
where c a are urban area fixed effects and δ t time fixes effects. In the municipality level analysis, the estimated equation is
where c i are municipality fixed effects. As there are only two data waves, the fixed effects estimator will be identical to the estimation in first differences
where ∆T ax it = T it − T ax i,t−1 , ∆ log(Empl it ) = log(Empl it /S i,t−1 ) and v it = ∆u it .
We have to take into account that the size of local jurisdictions is likely endogenous.
First, locations with low taxes are likely to attract -ceteris paribus -more firms and hence are larger then locations with high taxes. This leads to endogeneity from reversed causality. Second, there may be omitted variables that explain both tax rates and location size. We therefore estimate equations (1) to (5) using instrumental variables. See sections 4.5 and 4.6 for a description of the used instruments.
Data and Variables
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. For a number of reasons, the Swiss fiscal system provides a well suited laboratory in which to examine our research question.
The Swiss federation consists of three government layers (federal, cantonal and municipal), with each jurisdictional level collecting a roughly similar share of total tax revenue.
Cantons and municipalities enjoy vast autonomy in the determination of their tax rates, and, as a consequence, we observe large variations in tax burdens even within the small area covered by Switzerland. Cantons and municipalities collect around 65 percent of the corporate income and capital tax revenue, the remaining 35 percent being raised by the federal government. Profit taxes account for 85 percent of corporate tax receipts. 
Geographical Definitions

Local Business Taxes
We use data on corporate income taxes created by Brülhart and Jametti (2006) Our dependent variable is the local tax rate for firms. P rof itT ax i is the corporate profit tax rate in location i as percentage of a firm's profit. We use the tax rate for a firm with median profits (9% of turnover in our sample). In the municipality level analysis, P rof itT ax i is the tax rate in municipality i plus the respective cantonal tax rate. In the urban area level analysis, P rof itT ax a is the employment-weighted average of the local tax rates P rof itT ax i in all reported municipalities i that belong to urban area a. 
Location Size
The main explanatory variable is the 'size' of the location. We measure the size of the EmplDist i is the number of full-time jobs in the economically relevant area in and around municipality i. It is the sum of the municipality's own employment and the employment of all other Swiss municipalities weighted by the inverse distance:
where EmplM uni i is employment in municipality i and J is the number of municipalities in the country. We include all of the roughly 3,000 municipalities in this calculation and not just the 845 for which tax data is available in 2005. Dist ij is the Euclidean distance between two municipalities i and i, and if j = i is measured as: where the x and y coordinates determine the geographical location of municipalities i and j. The so-called 'own distance' of municipality i is calculated as
where AreaBuilt i is built-up land area in the municipality. The own distance is the average distance to the municipal centre assuming a circular municipality of the same size. The own distance acknowledges that firms are on average further away from each other in large municipalities than in small ones. It also guarantees that our variable
EmplDist i is invariant to the units in which distance is measured. as well as for EmplDist. In regressions including both variables, the identifying variation that allows to discriminate the effects of the two variables will stem from small and mid-size municipalities which can be found in the centre as well as the periphery of urban areas.
In the urban area level analysis, we make no distinction between political and economic definition. EmplArea a is the number of jobs in all municipalities i that belong to urban area a. Tables 1 and 2 
Further Location Characteristics
We also include the following three control variables:
F renchItalian i and F renchItalian a are dummy variables which equal 1 if the population in municipality i or, respectively, urban area a are on the majority French or Italian speaking. Historically, French and Italian speaking Swiss jurisdictions have higher tax rates than German speaking ones.
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Centre i is a dummy variable which equals 1 if municipality i is the central place of the urban area it belongs to. CapitalCity i is a dummy variable which equals 1 if municipality i is the capital of a canton. These variables capture the additional revenue needs of central places and capital cities, respectively.
Instruments for Cross-section Analysis
We seek to explain local tax rates with the size of the location. There is obvious concern about the exogeneity of this variable. First, locations with low taxes are likely to attract -ceteris paribus -more firms and hence are larger than locations with high taxes. This leads to endogeneity from reversed causality. Second, there may be omitted variables that explain both tax rates and location size. Our proposed instrumental variables mainly seek to eliminate the bias from reversed causality. cantons. Eugster and Parchet (2011) use a regression discontinuity approach to show that the French culture causes higher tax rates and public expenditure in Swiss municipalities around the language border. 8 We obtained the data through its (now decommissioned) online platform "Statweb". Historical population figures are reported for present-day municipalities taking into account potential mergers and split-ups of municipalities.
own population and the distance-weighted population of all other municipalities:
where Dist ij is the Euclidean distance between municipalities i and j. This calculation is based on all of the roughly 3,000 Swiss municipalities. As instrument in the urban area level analysis, P opArea a,1850 sums over all municipalities i that belong to urban area a as defined in 2000.
Descriptive statistics for all instruments are also reported in Tables 1 and 2 
Instruments for Panel Data Analysis
In the 1985-2005 panel data analysis, fixed effects will take care of a large part of potential omitted variables. However, there remains the concern about reversed causality. Locations with less increase (or even a decrease) in tax rates will -ceteris paribus -attract more firms and hence exhibit higher employment growth. We therefore instrument employment growth from 1985 to 2005. We propose two sets of variables as instruments:
LandReserve i is the fraction of land that has not been built-up by 1985 and could potentially be used for buildings in the subsequent 20 years. 9 It is calculated as
where AreaBuilt i is the land area used for housing, businesses and traffic; AreaT otal i is the total land area excluding rivers, lakes, mountains, etc. Our definition is entirely based on the physical characteristics of the location and ignores zoning restrictions. We think that 1985 zoning restrictions were not binding over the 20 subsequent years as they could be relaxed by the political economy in locations with strong demand for land. We which is independent of the location. We use the growth rate in Germany, Growth and around municipality i. This is analogously defined to EmplDist i . We calculate this measure by summing over the location's own predicted employment and the distanceweighted predicted employment of all other municipalities:
where Dist ij is the Euclidean distance between municipalities i and j.
In the urban area level analysis, P redEmplArea a is the sum of P redEmplM uni i over all municipalities i that belong to the corresponding urban area a.
In the municipality level analysis, we also use the geographic location within the urban area as instrument. DistCentre i is the distance of each municipality to the centre of the urban area. Municipalities that do not belong to any urban area are assigned the distance to the nearest urban area centre. 
Results
We analyse the data on two different levels of aggregation. In the urban area level analysis, data on tax rates and location size are aggregated to the level of urban areas. In the municipality level analysis, tax rates of individual municipalities and their size are used. Section 3 discusses these two approaches.
Urban Area Level Results
Cross-section results of the urban area level analysis for the year 2005 are reported in Table 3 . Column [1] shows the result of a regression of profit tax rates (P rof itT ax i ) on the log of total urban area employment (EmplArea i ) across 55 Swiss urban areas. The tax rates are based on the 553 largest municipalities in the country. The estimated effect of employment is positive and highly significant (t = 2.93). The point estimate of 0.0102 means that a doubling in the size of the urban area leads to an increase in tax rates of log(2)·0.0102 = 0.7% points. This is a substantial effect given that tax rates are on average 17% and that the largest urban area is 150 times larger than the smallest urban area (see Table 1 ). The above reported effects are likely biased as our explanatory variable location size is not exogenous. Low tax rates attract more businesses leading to larger location size in the long run. This leads to a reverse causality problem in our estimation of equation (1).
We therefore estimate the relationship using the population in 1850 (P opArea i,1850 ) as instrument. See Section 4.5 for a detailed description and motivation of the instruments used. Column [3] in Table 3 reports the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. Table A1 in the appendix shows the corresponding first stage estimates. Our instrument is very strong with a first stage F-Test on the excluded instrument of 222.
11 The 2nd stage results reveal a substantially increased point estimate for the effect of location size. This increase goes in the expected direction as the reverse causality running from taxes to location size would have predicted a negative relationship between local taxes and location size. The point estimate of 0.0128 is still significant on the 1% level and means that a doubling in the size of the urban area leads to an increase in tax rates of log(2) · 0.0128 = 0.9% points.
The significantly positive relationship reported in Table 3 could be confounded with other factors that differ across urban areas. We seek to control for such omitted factors with a difference-in-difference strategy using the long (20 years) difference between 1985 to 2005. which regresses 20-year changes in tax rates on the growth rate of local employment.
Even controlling for urban area fixed effects, we find a positive but insignificant effect.
Note, however, that despite the 20 year lag, the within-variance of log(EmplArea) is 18 times smaller than the between variance. This reflects the enormous stability of the Swiss urban system. It is therefore not unexpected that we do not find a significant effect with so little identifying variation. The large confidence bounds include the significant results from the 2005 cross-section and do not contradict them.
In the last column [3] of Table 4 we seek to control for the potential reverse causality of tax rates and size with instrumental variables. As described in section 4.6, our two instruments are land reserves in the centre municipality in 1985 (LandReserveCentre) and 2005 employment predicted from the 1985 sector composition (P redEmplArea). Our 11 We use robust tests throughout as we have no reason to assume that our error term is homoscedastic. instruments are individually and jointly highly significant in the first stage (see Table A1 in the appendix). Not unexpectedly with a sample size of 53, the F-statistic of 6.88 reveals that our instruments are nevertheless rather weak. The estimated confidence bounds of the parameter is again non-informative: while we cannot detect a significant relationship we can also not rule out the results from the cross-section.
Municipality Level Results
The results for the 2005 cross-section of the municipality level analysis are given in Table 5 .
Column [1] reports the results from a regression of the local profit tax rate on local employment within municipal borders (EmplM uni) across 845 Swiss municipalities. The estimated effect is virtually zero and not significant. Column [2] regresses local taxes on employment in and around the municipality (EmplDist). The estimated effect is now positive and highly significant. Column [3] includes both measures of location size. See section 4.3 for a description of the two measures and the identifying differences. The estimated effects are almost identical to the bivariate results in columns [1] and [2] . The point estimate of EmplDist is highly significant (t = 3.28) and almost perfectly matches our findings in the urban area level analysis in Table 3 , column [1] . Column [4] includes in addition dummy variables for whether the municipality belongs to the French or Italian speaking part of Switzerland (F renchItalian), whether it is the central place of the urban area (Centre) and whether it is a cantonal capital city (CapitalCity). Controlling for these additional variables, the effect of urban area size is reinforced while the effect of jurisdictional size remains zero.
As in the previous section, we are concerned about bias from reverse causality in columns [1] to [4] . We therefore instrument both the political size of the location (EmplM uni) and its economic size (EmplDist). We use historical population figures from 1850 (P opM uni 1850 and P opDist 1850 ) as instruments as described in section 4.5.
Column [5] reports the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. First stage results are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. The two instruments are highly significant predictors for the corresponding employment variable. The joint F-test for weak instruments which jointly tests both first stage regressions is 49 and shows that the instruments are very strong. 12 The IV point estimate for the effect of EmplM uni is now positive and significant while the effect of EmplDist is almost halved compared to column [4] . This change of the parameters between OLS and IV goes in the expected direction as the reverse 12 We use the Kleibergen causality would predict a negative relationship between local taxes and jurisdiction size.
However, the effect of the economically relevant area EmplDist is still much larger (2.5 times) than the effect of the jurisdiction size.
Columns [6] to [10] in Table 5 include a fixed effect for each urban area. 13 This analysis relies fully on the variation of location sizes within urban areas and ignores the differences across urban areas. Including urban area fixed effects fundamentally changes our results: both jurisdiction (EmplM uni) and area size (EmplDist) have no significant effect in any of the specifications in columns [6] to [9] . This is not the consequence of a lack of identifying variation as the confidence bounds are small and ruling out effects of the magnitude reported in column [1] to [4] . The significantly positive effects in columns [1] to [4] are therefore entirely driven by differences across urban areas as documented in the urban area level analysis in section 5.1.
Column [10] in Table 5 includes urban area fixed effects as well as instrumental variables. The results of the two first stage regressions are reported in Table A2 . As in column [5] , 1850 population for jurisdiction (P opM uni 1850 ) and area size (P opDist 1850 ) are significant predictors for 2005 employment and pass the test against weak instruments (Kleibergen-Paap F = 21). Also as in column [5] , controlling for reverse causality mainly affects the effect of jurisdictions size (EmplM uni). This effect is now positive and significant while the effect of the area size (EmplDist) remains close to zero and insignificant.
So within urban areas, it is the political size of the municipality that affects local tax rates while the economic size does not matter: small municipalities set lower taxes than large ones whether they are in the centre of the economic activity of the urban area or at its periphery. We see this result as evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather than the New Economic Geography (NEG) mechanism is at work in the competition of municipalities within a given urban area. Table 5 , columns [1] to [4] . Column [2] controls for municipality fixed effects, i.e.
for all time-invariant characteristics including urban area fixed effects. This fixed effects (FE) estimator is equivalent to the first difference estimator (FD) which regresses 20-year changes in tax rates on the growth rate of local employment. As in the urban area level analysis, there is very little time variation that we can exploit and the large confidence intervals neither detect significant effects nor rule out effects as estimated in the cross-section. Column [3] additionally includes year specific urban area effects leading to negative though insignificant size effects. 13 Municipalities not belonging to an urban area were assigned to the urban area whose central place is closest to them.
Column [4] in Table 6 tackles the potential reversed causality of changes in tax rates on employment growth by instrumenting both employment growth of the jurisdiction and of the urban area. See section 4.6 for a description of the instruments used. Most of our 5 instruments are highly significant in both first stage regressions (see Table A2 in the appendix) though the joint analysis of both equations with the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F-statistics shows that the instruments are rather weak. The estimates in column [4] are therefore at best indicative.
Summing up the cross-section results in Table 3 and 5, we find that municipalities in large urban areas set higher tax rates than municipalities in small urban areas. This is consistent with the New Economic Geography (NEG) prediction whereby agglomeration rents are taxed in the competition among urban areas. Within urban areas, however, the size of the economically relevant area in and around a municipality is unrelated to its tax level while the size within its political borders is positively related. This result is robust to controlling for reverse causality by using instrumental variables. We see this result as evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather than the NEG mechanism is at work in the competition of municipalities within an urban area. Controlling for fixed effects in the panel analysis of Tables 4 and 6 is non-informative and neither supports nor contradicts these findings.
Alternative Cluster Measures
The New Economic Geography (NEG) literature typically considers only urbanisation economies, and neglects varying intensities in agglomeration economies across sectors. So far we have followed this simplification in our empirical analysis in section 5. In this section we construct a cluster intensity measure which takes into account the structure of the economy at the local level. We also include two well-known measures of sectoral composition of the local economy: specialisation and diversification.
Cluster intensity
Different industrial sectors exhibit in the real world different degrees of agglomeration rents. In our setting, local jurisdiction can not exploit this heterogeneity as statutory tax rates apply identically to all sectors. Local jurisdictions can potentially tax agglomeration rents if three conditions are met: (1) it hosts an industrial cluster of a sector, (2) this sector is an important fraction of the local economy and (3) this sector is characterised by important agglomeration economies. This applies for example to the watch-making industry, an industry characterised by high agglomeration economies which satisfies con-dition (3). Consider Le Locle, a rural town in the Jura. Le Locle hosts one of the largest concentrations of watch manufacturers in Switzerland, accounting for the majority of local employment (over 45% in 2005). Now consider Geneva, the 2nd largest city in Switzerland. Geneva hosts another main cluster of the watch-making industry, yet it does not account for a significant part of the local economy (only 1.5% of local employment in 2005), and therefore does not satisfy condition (2) above.
We propose the following index to measure the importance of industrial clusters in the local economy:
where Empl s is total employment in sector s. EmplM uni is /Empl s is the fraction of employment in sector s located in municipality i; a high number indicates that the municipality hosts an important industrial cluster. The second multiplier EmplM uni is /Empl i is the fraction of employment in municipality i belonging to sector s; a high number indicating that the sector is important for the local economy. The third multiplier γ s is a measure of the agglomeration economies in sector s.
To measure agglomeration economies we use the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index 14 :
where z is = EmplM uni is /Empl s and x i = EmplM uni i /Empl tot , Empl tot denoting total national employment. H s is an index measuring the concentration of an industry as
k , where ψ k is the share of each plant in industry employment, and K the total number of industry plants. The Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index is constructed to take into account the possibility of industry agglomeration by pure chance, unrelated to any agglomeration economies.
Specialisation and Diversification
Two important factors characterising the economic activity of a municipality are the degree to which they are specialised and diversified. We use in our analysis the specialisation and diversification indices employed by Duranton and Puga (2000) .
As a specialisation measure we use employment in the most important industry s of municipality i Duranton and Overman (2005) propose an alternative index which avoids the border problem of the Ellison-Glaeser index. Unfortunately, we cannot use this index as we lack information on the exact geographic location of firms in our data.
where EmplM uni is is the number of employees in municipality i working in sector s and EmplM uni i is as defined above. This index measures the importance of the largest sector in a municipality, and allows for a comparison across municipalities.
As a diversity measure we use the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index,
This index increases with increasing diversity of the local economy, equalling 1 if the activity of a sector is entirely concentrated in one municipality.
Note that using these specifications, diversification and specialisation are not exactly opposites. A municipality with one very important sector but many less important ones can be both specialised and diversified. Table 7 reports the results using the three alternative measures, cluster intensity, specialisation and diversification. Table 7 column [1] shows the urban area level analysis for the 2005 cross-section. Our new measure ClusterIntensity turns out positive and highly significant. This means that urban areas with important clusters of concentrated sectors rise higher business taxes than others. However, the effect is rather small: a one-standard deviation increase in ClusterIntensity leads to a 0.0006 · 8.9593 = .5% points increase in tax rates.
Results
Specialisation is insignificant while Diversif ication is also positively related to tax rates.
Column [2] uses the 1985 to 2005 panel and includes urban area fixed effects. The effect of our measure is now negative though not significantly so. Table 7 
Conclusion
In this paper we study whether local policy makers effectively tax agglomeration rents, as predicted by the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature. To test this mechanism we use data from a panel of Swiss municipalities. We face several challenges bridging the gap between theoretical model and empirical evaluation. First, the standard tax competition model with asymmetric jurisdiction size also predicts that small locations (tax havens) have lower tax rates than large ones, but the economic implications are very different. To separate the two effects we make a clear difference between the political and economic size of a location by developing a measure for each definition of size. We find that large urban areas exhibit higher tax rates than small ones. This is consistent with the NEG prediction whereby agglomeration rents are taxed in the competition among urban areas.
Within urban areas, however, the size of the economically relevant area in and around a municipality is unrelated to its tax level while the size within its political borders is positively related. We see this result as evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather than the NEG mechanism is at work in the competition of municipalities within an urban area. Second, there could be important unobserved and unobservable local characteristics. Appendix Table A1. 3 Robust F-statistic on excluded instruments.
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